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Summary 
Business leaders, government officials, and academics are focusing considerable 
attention  on the concept of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR), particularly in the 
realm of environmental  protection. Beyond complete compliance with environmental 
regulations, do firms have additional  moral or social responsibilities to commit 
resources to environmental protection? How should we  think about the notion of firms 
sacrificing profits in the social interest? May they do so within the  scope of their 
fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Can they do so on a sustainable basis,  
or will the forces of a competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts 
transient at  best? Do firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way, 
reducing their earnings by  voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship? And 
finally, should firms carry out such profit-sacrificing  activities (i.e., is this an efficient 
use of social resources)? We address these questions  through the lens of economics, 
including insights from legal analysis and business scholarship. 
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Through an Economic Lens
Forest L. Reinhardt∗, Robert N. Stavins∗∗,a n d
Richard H. K. Vietor∗∗∗
Introduction
Business leaders, government ofﬁcials, and academics are focusing more and more attention
ontheconceptof“corporatesocialresponsibility”(CSR).Thecentralissueistheappropriate
roleofbusiness.Everyoneagreesthatﬁrmsshouldobeythelaw.Butbeyondthelaw—beyond
full compliance with environmental regulations—do ﬁrms have additional moral or social
responsibilities to (voluntarily) commit resources to environmental protection?
One of the challenges of examining the concept of CSR is simply identifying a consistent
and sensible deﬁnition from among a bewildering range of concepts and deﬁnitions that
have been proposed in the literature.1 We adopt a simple deﬁnition originally offered by
Elhauge (2005): sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest. This deﬁnition has the merit of
being consistent with some of the most useful prior perspectives (Graff Ziven and Small
2005; Portney 2005; Reinhardt 2005), while focusing the discussion on the most interesting
normative and positive questions.
Of course, questions regarding sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest apply beyond the
environmental sphere. The academic debate over the legality of sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the
publicinterestappearstohavebegunin1932withopposingarticles(Dodd1932;Berle1932)
in a Harvard Law Review symposium on “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?”
The debate in economics began more recently, with Milton Friedman’s 1970 article, “The
Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Proﬁts,” in the New York Times Magazine.
Sincethen,thedebatehascontinued,andCSRhasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromboth
scholars and the public, especially in the environmental protection area.
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The purposeof this article,which is partof a three-articlesymposiumon CorporateSocial
Responsibility and the Environment,2 is to introduce and provide an overview of the major
issues related to CSR, synthesize what is known about CSR in the environmental arena, and
thereby identify where the greatest uncertainties remain. To this end, we address four key
questions about the issue of ﬁrms sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest.3 May they do so
within the scope of their ﬁduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Can they do so on a
sustainablebasis,orwilltheforcesofacompetitivemarketplacerendersucheffortsandtheir
impacts transient at best? Do ﬁrms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way,
reducing their earnings by voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship? And ﬁnally,
should ﬁrms carry out such proﬁt-sacriﬁcing activities? In other words, is this an efﬁcient use
of social resources?
This article is organized as follows. We begin by examining legal thinking about whether
ﬁrms may sacriﬁce proﬁts to beneﬁt individuals other than their shareholders, and then look
at the legality of CSR in the United States and other countries. Next, we draw on theories
of industrial organization and management to identify circumstances under which ﬁrms
can sacriﬁce proﬁts without being punished by market forces. We then turn to positive
questions about whether ﬁrms actually do engage in CSR. Here we review and synthesize
empirical evidence to assess whether some ﬁrms truly exceed full compliance with the law,
andifso,whethertheir“sociallyresponsible”actionsactuallysacriﬁceproﬁts.Toaddressour
fourth question, should ﬁrms—from a societal perspective—be carrying out such activities,
we examine CSR in a normative light and consider economic arguments on both sides of the
issue. The ﬁnal section summarizes our ﬁndings and offers some conclusions.
May Firms Sacriﬁce Proﬁts in the Social Interest?
Theprevailingviewamongmosteconomistsandbusinessscholarsisthatcorporatedirectors
have a ﬁduciary duty to maximize proﬁts for shareholders. While this view underlies many
economic models of ﬁrm behavior, its legal basis is actually not very strong. The judicial
record, although supportive of a duty to maximize proﬁts for shareholders, also leaves room
for the possibility that ﬁrms may sacriﬁce proﬁts in the public interest. The courts’ deference
towards the judgment of businesspeople—the “business judgment rule”—prevents many
public-minded managerial actions from being legally challenged.
The Legal Purpose of the Corporation
The most widely accepted position on the legal purpose of the corporation—known as
shareholder primacy (Springer 1999; Fisch 2006; Ehrlich 2005)—was articulated by Milton
Friedman in 1970:
Inafree-enterprise,private-propertysystem,acorporateexecutiveisanemployee
of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which
2The other two articles in the symposium, by Lyon and Maxwell (forthcoming) and Portney (forthcoming),
discuss CSR from the theoretical and empirical perspectives, respectively.
3These four questions were originally identiﬁed by Hay, Stavins, and Vietor (2005).Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 3
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom (Friedman 1970).
A more subtle version of the shareholder primacy argument is the “nexus of contracts”
approach (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Easterbrook and Fischel 1991), which views the
corporation as a nexus of legal contracts between the suppliers of various factors of pro-
duction, who agree to cooperate in order to generate monetary returns. These agreements
specify that in exchange for their contributions, the owners of most factors of production—
labor, land, intellectual property rights, etc.—will receive set payments with little risk.
Shareholders—the suppliers of capital—accept the residual ﬁnancial risk of doing business,
and in return receive the residual proﬁts. Since shareholders have no contractual guarantee
of a ﬁxed payment from the ﬁrm’s activities, any proﬁts that are diverted towards other
activities, such as pursuit of “the social good,” come directly out of their pockets (Butler and
McChesney 1999). Thus, from this perspective, CSR is close to theft.
A second view of the role of the corporation is found in the team-production model (Blair
and Stout 1999), which views the corporation as the solution to the moral hazard problem
that arises when the owners of factors of production must make ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments
but fear they will not be rewarded ex post. To solve this problem, the board of directors of
the corporation functions as a neutral “mediating hierarch” that allocates residual proﬁts to
all of the factors of production (team members) according to their relative contributions.4
Under the team-production model, sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest is legal, as long as
the proﬁts are allocated to a deserving factor of production.
Athirdviewofthepurposeofthecorporationisthe“operationaldiscretion”model,which
holds that the law grants corporate managers discretion to comply with social and moral
norms, even if doing so reduces shareholder proﬁts (Elhauge 2005). The judiciary’s unwill-
ingness to second-guess matters of business judgment has the practical effect of shielding
managers who choose to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the public interest.
A fourth and ﬁnal position is the “progressive view” that the corporation is organized
for the beneﬁt of society at large, or at the very least, corporate directors have ﬁduciary
responsibilities that extend to a wide variety of stakeholders (Sheehy 2005; Gabaldon 2006).
Under this view, sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the public interest is entirely legal. The progressive
view, however, is not well rooted in either statutes or case law (Clark 1986).
The Legality of CSR in the United States
In the United States, a variety of legal requirements deﬁne the responsibilities of the cor-
poration (and its board of directors) to shareholders and other stakeholders. However, as
discussed below, these requirements are limited in practice.
4For example, many US states have enacted statutes that permit corporate directors to consider the interests
of stakeholders other than shareholders.4 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
CorporateResponsibilitiesto Shareholders and Other Stakeholders
AlthoughcorporationsintheUnitedStatesaregrantedthe“legalﬁctionofseparatecorporate
personality,” a corporation’s decisions are made by its board of directors, or by executives
who have been delegated decision-making authority (Clark 1986). To ensure that directors
andmanagersdonotactnegligentlyorsubvertcorporateresourcesfortheirownbeneﬁt,the
legal system imposes ﬁduciary duties of care and loyalty.
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act “in good faith and in the best interests
of the corporation” (Scalise 2005), and places limitations on the motives, purposes, and
goals that can legitimately inﬂuence directors’ decisions (Cox and Hazen 2003). The duty
of care complements the duty of loyalty by requiring managers to “exercise that degree
of skill, diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar
circumstances” (Clark 1986, p. 123). Violation of ﬁduciary duties can result in personal
liability for directors (Scalise 2005). Legal formulations of ﬁduciary duties typically refer to
the“bestinterestsofthecorporation,”butwhetherthecorporation’s“bestinterests”include
only its shareholders or a wider set of constituents is not immediately clear (Cox and Hazen
2003). The prevailing opinion is that ﬁduciary duties are owed to shareholders (Blomquist
2006), but a minority supports the view that corporations can be managed in part for the
beneﬁt of other stakeholders (Lee 2005).
Every US state recognizes the right of businesses to make charitable contributions. Seven
states allow charitable donations regardless of corporate beneﬁt, and nineteen other states
allow donations that beneﬁt the business or advance the public welfare (Choper, Coffee,
and Gilson 2004). Statutes in the remaining 24 states (including Delaware) include similar
language, but without legal clariﬁcation about whether donations are permitted when they
do not beneﬁt the ﬁrm (Donohue 2005).5
State corporate statutes grant corporations legal powers similar to those of people, and
allow corporations to participate in lawful activities (Clark 1986). As a result, corpora-
tions presumably have the power (but not necessarily the right) to undertake CSR activities
(Donohue2005).Corporationscanwritetheirowncorporatecharterstoexplicitlyauthorize
themselves to participate in CSR. For example, the New York Times is incorporated to pursue
objectives other than proﬁt maximization (Donohue 2005).
These statutory requirements and judicial precedents place limits on the actions of cor-
porations and their boards. But an important judicial construct—the business judgment
rule—creates substantial deference to ﬁrms’ managerial decisions.
The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule “acts as a presumption in favor of corporate managers’ actions”
(Branson2002).Itrequirescourtstodefertothejudgmentofcorporatemanagers,aslongas
theirdecisionssatisfycertainbasicrequirementsrelatedtonegligenceandconﬂictofinterest.
The basic premise is that since corporate managers are far more skilled at making business
judgments than courts, allowing courts to second-guess managers’ decisions would create
potentially large transactions costs (Elhauge 2005).
5In addition, twenty-nine states have statutes that allow managers to consider the interests of non-
shareholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and society at large (Springer 1999).Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 5
The business judgment rule makes ﬁduciary duties difﬁcult to enforce, and it effectively
grants managers discretion to “temper business decision making with their perceptions of
social values” (Clark 1986; Fisch 2006; Scalise 2005; Blair and Stout 1999).6 As a practical
matter,aslongasmanagerscanplausiblyclaimthattheiractionsareinthelongruninterests
of the ﬁrm, it is almost impossible for shareholdersto challenge the actions of managers who
act in the public interest.
The business judgment rule also offers managers protection from accusations of conﬂict
of interest, primarily because it does not recognize most nonﬁnancial incentives as conﬂicts
(Elhauge2005;Branson2002).Corporatemanagers’decisionscanberegardedasirrational—
and thus not protected by the business judgment rule—only if they “go so far beyond the
boundsof reasonablebusinessjudgmentthattheironlyexplanationis badfaith”(Blomquist
2006, p. 699). Donohue (2005) cites the extreme example of a Delaware court that ruled that
the business judgment rule protected the 1989 decision by Occidental Petroleum to spend
$120 million, slightly less than half of the company’s yearly net proﬁt, on an art museum
named after its 91-year-old CEO, Armand Hammer.
So, are ﬁrms in the United States prohibited from sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the public interest?
And if so, is the prohibition enforceable? The answers to these two questions appear to
be “maybe” and “no,” respectively. “While case law falls short of unequivocally mandating
shareholderwealthmaximization,italsofallsshortofunambiguouslyauthorizingthepursuit
of non-shareholder interests other than instrumentally for the beneﬁt of the shareholders”
(Lee 2006, p. 557). And as long as managers claim some plausible connection to future
proﬁtability,thebusinessjudgmentrulegrantsthemsubstantialleewaytocommitcorporate
resources to projects that beneﬁt the public.
The Legality of CSR in Other Countries
With their cultural traditions of social democracy or ﬁrm loyalty to employees, most
European countries and Japan have legal systems that differ from the system in the United
States. The legal systems in these other countries place a greater emphasis on stakeholder
participation, and sometimes codify this by legalizing various forms of proﬁt-sacriﬁcing be-
havior. Europeans have sought to incorporate CSR into their investment climate, both at
the institutional and individual level (Sutton 2004), and in strong social democracies, such
as Germany and France, stakeholders (particularly employees) have much stronger legal
positions than in the United States (Roe 2000). Corporations in Europe and Asia are also
more likely to have a few large shareholders, who may take social responsibilities seriously,
particularly those towards employees (Roe 2000). This contrasts with the pattern of highly
dispersed share ownership in the United States.
Industrialized Countries
Common law industrialized countries, primarily former British possessions, share many
legal features with the United States. Corporations in these countries have similar board
6Forexample,Clarkcitesthe1968caseofShlenskyv.Wrigley,inwhichtheIllinoisCourtofAppealsallowed
WilliamWrigley,Jr.,thepresidentandmajorityshareholderoftheChicagoCubs,torefusetoinstalllightsat
WrigleyFieldbecauseofhisbeliefthatnightgameswouldbebadforthesurroundingneighborhood(1986).6 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
structures, face similar legal requirements, and even share some legal precedents. In such
countries, CSR is discouraged, but permitted. Under Australian corporate law, for example,
corporate managers are required to make decisions in the best interest of the corporation,
while a statutory business judgment rule grants managers considerable discretion (Corﬁeld
1998). Likewise, Canadian law requires that directors and ofﬁcers of corporations act in the
best interests of the corporation, but the director is not permitted to ignore the collective
interestsofshareholders(Borok2003).TheUnitedKingdom’slegalsystempermitscorporate
managers to engage in socially beneﬁcial activities, as long as there is a plausible rationale
that the activities are in shareholders’ interests (Lynch-Fannon 2007).
In contrast with common law jurisdictions, countries with civil law systems tend to
place a greater emphasis on stakeholder participation in corporate governance. Corporate
boards often include employee representatives, and cultural traditions emphasize loyalty
to employees. In these countries, more forms of CSR are permissible. In France, cor-
porate directors have both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty (Fanto 1998). Although
there has been a shift towards more investor friendly laws, the French legal code explic-
itly allows directors to make decisions based on the interests of all constituencies. German
law does not even give management an explicit obligation to maximize shareholder value
(MarinovandHeiman1998),andlargeGermancorporationshaveatwo-tieredboardstruc-
ture that encourages the board to consider the interests of parties other than shareholders
(Corﬁeld 1998).
Japanese corporate law is similar to corporate law in the United States, in that di-
rectors have duties of care and loyalty, which, if violated, can be grounds for share-
holder lawsuit. But Japanese corporations have a strong tradition of CSR oriented towards
their employees. In years with high proﬁts, large corporations usually retain their earn-
ings and reinvest them for the beneﬁt of employees (Miwa 1999). The shares of many
ﬁrms are owned by banks who handle ﬁrms’ credit or by important business partners
(Corﬁeld 1998). These shareholder-creditors have ﬁnancial goals that are similar to those
of long-term employees, particularly in terms of corporate stability and minimizing risk
(Roe 2000).
Developing CountriesandMultinationalEnterprises
Corporate law in developing countries has a number of special characteristics. First, the cor-
porate legal system is often new. As a result, businesses have little experience complying with
the law, and there are fewer judicial precedents mapping out the law’s boundaries. Second,
legal institutions in developing countries are often weak. Regulations can go unenforced;
agency problems can bea serious issue;and members of the judiciarymay be corrupt.Third,
the operations of multinational corporations in these countries can lead to conﬂicts between
the interests of home and host states.
Thus, both the laws governing CSR and the degree to which those laws are enforced may
vary substantially across developing countries. Assuming that the laws in most developing
countries allow some scope for managerial activity that may sacriﬁce proﬁts, the question
remains whether ﬁrms can do so in view of competitive pressures in the markets for their
outputs and inputs. It is to this question that we now turn.Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 7
Can Firms Sacriﬁce Proﬁts in the Social Interest?
Just because the legal system may allow ﬁrms to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social interest does
n o tm e a nt h a tﬁ r m scan do so on a sustainable basis in the face of competitive pressures.
Under what conditions is it economically feasible for ﬁrms to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social
interest? Before turning to this question, we address a somewhat broader question: under
what conditions might it be sustainable for ﬁrms to produce goods and services, such as
public goods, that beneﬁt individuals other than their customers (Lyon and Maxwell 2004;
Vogel 2006)?
We identify six conditions that would facilitate the production of such goods and services.
All six of these conditions involve government intervention, imperfect competition, or both.
First is the imposition of regulatory constraints that require a ﬁrm as well as its competitors
to carry out some socially beneﬁcial actions. Second is the possibility that such production is
not costly to the ﬁrm. For example, restaurants frequently donate leftover food to homeless
shelters. The third condition is that the socially beneﬁcial actions may reduce a ﬁrm’s
businessexpensesbyanamountgreaterthanthecostoftheactionsthemselves.Forexample,
installation of energy-saving (climate friendly) technologies may generate long-term cost
savings that outweigh upfront costs. Fourth, in some cases socially beneﬁcial actions may
yield an increase in revenue. It is easy to think of goods and services that are differentiated
along environmental lines, such as clothing made of organic cotton, or wood from forests
managed in accordance with some principles of sustainability. Socially beneﬁcial actions
could also generate goodwill, improving a ﬁrm’s reputation and sales. Fifth, ﬁrms may
choose to go beyond full compliance with environment, health, or safety laws in order to
improvetheirpositionincurrentorfutureregulatorynegotiations.Bydoingso,theymaybe
able to deﬂect or inﬂuence future regulation or deﬂect enforcement of existing regulation.
Sixth, some ﬁrms may use overcompliance to spur future regulation, which would provide a
competitive advantage over less adaptable ﬁrms.
We now turn to our more restrictive deﬁnition of CSR and address the question raised
above: under what conditions is it economically feasible for ﬁrms to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the
social interest?
When Is It Feasible for Firms to Engage in Proﬁt-Sacriﬁcing CSR?
In some cases ﬁrms undertake CSR actions voluntarily, while in others they engage in CSR
only under pressure from market participants or other social forces. In practice, it is difﬁcult
to discern voluntary from “reluctant” CSR. Whether CSR initiatives are voluntary or reluc-
tant, their economic sustainability depends on the market pressures and social expectations
confronted by the ﬁrm (Borck, Coglianese, and Nash 2006).
Voluntary CSR
The ﬁrst possibility—that stakeholders voluntarily sacriﬁce proﬁts—is what some observers
would think of as the “purest form” of CSR. The primary economic agents who could fund
such activities are shareholders and employees.
Some shareholders may be willing to subsidize ﬁrms’ proﬁt sacriﬁcing behavior. Stock
issued by socially responsible ﬁrms is a composite commodity, which combines a ﬁnancial8 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
investment product with a charitable giving vehicle (Graff Zivin and Small 2005). When
investors purchase the stock, they may be motivated by self-interest or by altruistic motives.
As long as investors are willing to fund CSR activities, ﬁrms can participate in them. But
whether investors are willing to accept lower returns may depend on whether the ﬁrm
already enjoys an economic position that allows it to obtain rents, such as through natural
monopolies, niche markets, imperfect information, regulatory distortions, anti-takeover
laws, and other market imperfections.7 In this case, investors sacriﬁcing proﬁt may still earn
returns above the market norm.
Willingness to accept below market returns may depend on whether investors hold stakes
in publicly—or privately—held companies. Investors with large private holdings are more
likelytotakeaninterestintheircompanies’activitiesandbeabletoinﬂuencethecompanies’
actions. Whether this additional interest and inﬂuence would have a positive or negative
inﬂuence on CSR is an open question.
Evidence suggests that some individuals are willing to pay more for socially responsible
goods (Jensen et al. 2002). The existence of such “ethical investors” could—in principle—
have consequences for ﬁrms that do not participate in CSR activities (Heinkel, Kraus, and
Zechner 2001). For example, if ethical investors’ choices increase the cost of capital for
“irresponsible”ﬁrms,someoftheseﬁrmsmightbeforcedtoadoptmoresociallyresponsible
practices. If the share price differential becomes sufﬁciently large, these ﬁrms may decide to
participate in CSR activities to increase their own stock price (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner
2001; Graff Zivin, and Small 2005). But the effect of green investors on the cost of capital
may be small. Because irresponsible ﬁrms will generate higher returns (relative to their stock
price),investorsintheseﬁrmswillaccumulatecapitalmorequicklythansociallyresponsible
investors, and over time may dominate the capital market. This would lead to a decrease in
the cost of capital for irresponsible businesses (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001).
Employees may sacriﬁce part of the returns to labor to further the social good. This could
occur explicitly if employees are given the opportunity to use their own salary and beneﬁts
to fund CSR projects. For example, some executives may be able to channel part of their
compensation towards the cost of CSR activities, or lawyers may be able to donate their time
to pro bono work. Employees may also fund CSR implicitly, such as when a ﬁrm works in
a ﬁeld that employees perceive as socially responsible (e.g., providing services to the elderly,
remediating oil spills). Employees may be willing to accept less than the fair market value
of their labor (as determined by the wage they would receive for working in a less socially
responsible industry), because they are compensated in other ways through the knowledge
that their work beneﬁts society at large (Frank 1996).
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on CSR and wages is inconclusive. Most revealed pref-
erence studies show that wages are lower at non-proﬁt ﬁrms than at for-proﬁt ﬁrms, but
this non-proﬁt wage penalty disappears in econometric analyses that control for worker
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics (Francois 2004). If non-proﬁt status is a proxy for social
7Firms have strong economic incentives to take advantage of any market power available to them. If a ﬁrm
maintains market power, it can—in principle—pass on the costs of CSR to its suppliers and/or customers.
For example, regulated public utilities, which are granted geographic monopolies on speciﬁc conditions
such as provision of universal service, may decide to engage in CSR activities and use the ﬁrm’s monopoly
power to pass resulting costs on to consumers.Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 9
responsibility, then socially responsible ﬁrms may not enjoy a signiﬁcant discount on labor
prices. This conclusion is supported by ﬁndings that CEO compensation at ﬁrms listed in
the Domini Social Index (DS 400) is not signiﬁcantly different from CEO compensation at
other ﬁrms in similar industries (Frye, Nelling, and Webb 2006).
ReluctantCSR
Corporate decisions are actually made by individual managers and directors, not by the
“ﬁrm” per se. Those decisions often further the interests of proﬁt-minded shareholders, but
notalways.InvestorsmayhavelittlechoicebuttoacceptsomedegreeofCSRproﬁt-sacriﬁcing
activities. It may be less costly to accept a degree of principal-agent “slack” than to eliminate
it completely, because managers who are excessively constrained may be ineffectual.
Investors may also be forced to accept proﬁt-sacriﬁcing activities that are the result of
external constraints. This may be particularly relevant in the developing world, where envi-
ronmental regulatory standards lag behind those of industrialized countries. For example,
equipmentpurchasedfromindustrializedcountriesmayincorporatepollutioncontroltech-
nologythatmeetsstandardsconsiderablystricterthanthoseineffectinadevelopingcountry
(Jaffe et al. 1995).
The magnitude of the proﬁts that managers can sacriﬁceagainst investors’ wishes depends
on the structure of managers’ compensation and the strength of shareholder oversight.
Principal/agent problems can be costly. Managers have been observed to “satisﬁce” proﬁts,
that is, they seek to achieve an adequate rate of return for shareholders and then divert the
ﬁrms’ resources to their personal ends (Choper, Coffee, and Gilson 2004; Clotfelter 1985).
UnsustainableCSR
Under many conditions, ﬁrms that participate in costly CSR activities will have to raise
prices, reduce wages and other costs, accept smaller proﬁts, or pay smaller dividends—and




the ﬁrm may face shareholder litigation, corporate takeover, or closure. Such consequences
simply illustrate the general proposition and observation that (ﬁnancially) inefﬁcient ﬁrms
tend to disappear (Alchian 1950; Altman 1999).
Thisprocessofeconomicsurvivaloftheﬁttestsuggeststhatﬁrmsthatengageinunsustain-
able CSR may ﬁnd themselves being pushed out of business. The forces of globalization only
increasethispressure.Giventheseeminglyinevitableoutcomeofthisprocess,whywouldany
ﬁrm choose to participate in unsustainable CSR activities? First, principal/agent problems
may lead managers to make decisions that commit the ﬁrm to short-term CSR actions, even
if those activities will not be continued in the long run. Second, managers may misjudge
the potential proﬁtability of certain actions, leading them to invest in actions that beneﬁt
society but harm the ﬁrm’s bottom line. Neither the managers’ probability assessments nor
their motivations are transparent to outside observers, making it very difﬁcult to distinguish
between them (Baron 2006).10 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
Economic, Structural, and Organizational Constraints
A variety of factors inﬂuence the economic actors who make decisions about engaging in
CSR activities. These factors include managerial incentive and monitoring constraints, and
organizational structure and culture.
Whether or not ﬁrms are able and likely to engage in CSR depends on managers’ incen-
tives and constraints, which in turn are determined by managers’ preferences, ethical beliefs,
contracts, and goals. The most direct incentives managers face are their employment agree-
ments. For managers whose compensation is designed to align their incentives with those
of shareholders, sacriﬁcing proﬁts means reducing their own compensation. In the United
States, chief executive ofﬁcers (CEOs) are usually paid in a mixture of stocks, stock options,
and salary, with their compensation linked to explicit measures of the ﬁrm’s performance
(Prendergast 1999). But the relationship between compensation and ﬁrm performance may
be close to ﬂat at some levels of ﬁrm performance, which means CEOs may be able to trade
off compensation against CSR activities at a rate they judge acceptable.
Organizational culture may also be signiﬁcant (Howard-Grenville, Nash, and Coglianese
2006). Organizational identity inﬂuences how individuals within the ﬁrm view the purpose
oftheﬁrm,whatitstandsfor,anditsfuturegoals.Organizationalself-monitoringaffectshow
anorganizationinteractswithoutsidestakeholders.Firmsthataremoreself-consciousabout
their image may expend greater effort to communicate and interact in “socially appropriate”
ways than other ﬁrms, even if their core values related to socially beneﬁcial behavior are
similar.
Other factors may also affect whether ﬁrms can sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social interest. For
example, ﬁrm size appears to matter, with evidence that larger ﬁrms can sacriﬁce propor-
tionately more proﬁts (Adams and Hardwick 1998). Further, public visibility may increase
pressure on ﬁrms to participate in CSR activities: ﬁrms in notoriously “dirty” industries may
ﬁndthemselvesunderheavypressurefrompublicadvocacygroupstoreducetheiremissions
or to participate in offsetting activities (Brown, Helland, and Kiholm Smith 2006). Finally,
ﬁrms cannot participate in CSR if their work provides no scope for it. CSR activities are
simply much more plausible for ﬁrms in certain industries (Porter and Kramer 2006).
Do Firms Sacriﬁce Proﬁts in the Social Interest?
As described above, there are speciﬁc circumstances in which ﬁrms can sacriﬁce proﬁts in
the social interest without suffering serious adverse economic consequences. Whether they
actuallydosoisanothermatter.Thissectiondiscussesempiricalevidenceabouttheexistence
of such proﬁt-sacriﬁcing behavior.
Before interpreting the evidence, it is important to be aware of several challenges to
making inferences about CSR. First, it is difﬁcult to test whether ﬁrms’ actions actually
go beyond ordinary compliance with environmental regulations. Data on environmental
performancearetypicallyverylimited,andbecauseofthedifﬁcultyofobservingappropriate
counterfactuals, it is difﬁcult to demonstrate that ﬁrms sacriﬁce proﬁts. Whole industries
often engage in CSR together, leaving behind no comparison group. Even when ﬁrms act
individually, it is difﬁcult to know whether unobservable characteristics explain differences
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practices are particularly vulnerable to this problem. For example, because many high-
technology companies have low pollutant emissions (in contrast with ﬁrms engaged in
electricity generation, heavy manufacturing, or resource extraction), the high-tech boom in
the 1990s created a perceived but spurious correlation between market measures of “socially
responsiblebusinesspractices”andstockreturns.Furthermore,asdiscussedabove,thereare
a variety of ways in which ﬁrms can proﬁt from investments in socially beneﬁcial projects.
Finally, the effects of many actions differ in the short versus the long term, with a short-
term decrease in proﬁts followed by a more-than-compensatory increase in the long-term
proﬁts. Thus, demonstrating that an action has truly sacriﬁced proﬁts in the social interest is
exceptionally difﬁcult.
Of course, distinguishing between motivations and outcomes is even more difﬁcult.
Although most ﬁrms are likely motivated by a combination of social and ﬁnancial concerns,
managers may cite social responsibility as the motive for actions that were actually driven
by proﬁtability. Or managers may use proﬁtability to justify socially responsible business
choices, even when those choices result in smaller proﬁts (Baron 2006).
Do Firms Overcomply?
A ﬁrst step in evaluating whether ﬁrms participate in CSR is to determine whether they
overcomply with regulations or participate in other costly activities that beneﬁt society. We
considerﬁvesourcesofevidence:voluntarygovernmentprograms,voluntaryindustryinitia-
tives, voluntary action by individual ﬁrms, corporate charitable donations, and shareholder
resolutions.
Voluntary GovernmentPrograms
In principle, the willingness of a ﬁrm to participate in a voluntary government program
could be evidence of CSR activity. A variety of studies have evaluated the determinants of
participation in voluntary government programs (e.g., Borck, Coglianese, and Nash 2006).
Several patterns emerge. First, larger ﬁrms are more likely to participate in voluntary pro-
grams. Second, participation is more likely for ﬁrms that either produce ﬁnal goods or
experiencemorepressurefrom NGOs and consumers.Third,ﬁrmswith higheremissionsor
poor compliance records are more likely to participate in voluntary programs. And fourth,
participation may be positively inﬂuenced by factors such as industry association member-
ship, R&D expenditures, organizational culture, and managerial discretion. However, there
isnoconsensusthatvoluntarygovernmentprogramshavegeneratedenvironmentalbeneﬁts
net of the opportunity cost of the resources required to implement them.
Voluntary Industry Initiatives
In addition to voluntary programs administered by governments, industry associations have
createdvoluntaryinitiatives.Forexample,theResponsibleCareprogram,establishedin1989
by the US Chemical Manufacturers Association, requires participating facilities to adopt
ten guiding principles and six codes of management practices related to the environmen-
tal and social dimensions of community interactions, facility management, and customer
and supplier interactions. By and large, the program was ineffective because it did not12 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
provide strong incentives for compliance (King and Lenox 2000). Similarly, the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was created in the wake of the 1979 reactor meltdown
at Three Mile Island, a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. A third example is Sustain-
able Slopes, a voluntary program for reporting and encouraging improved environmental
performance at ski resorts. The evidence indicates that ﬁrms took advantage of positive
publicity, although the actual environmental beneﬁts are debatable (Rivera and de Leon
2004).
In general, industry-sponsored programs exhibit the same kinds of participation patterns
as government-administered voluntary programs. That is, larger ﬁrms, more prominent
ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with poorer environmental records are more likely to participate. Again,
there is no systematic evidence of positive environmental impacts net of social costs.




taking a holistic management approach towards compliance with environmental and safety
laws, contractual and voluntary environmental obligations, management of environmental
and social impacts and risk, and other issues (Clark 2005). These systems may beneﬁt ﬁrms
by allowing them to manage the business aspects of environmental and social issues, but
they may also serve as a mechanism for ﬁrms to improve environmental quality or otherwise
beneﬁt society.
One such mechanism is ISO 14001, an international standard that provides guidelines
formonitoringenvironmentaloutputs,controllingenvironmentalprocesses,andimproving
environmental performance (US Environmental Protection Agency 2006). To demonstrate
that its environmental management system complies with the standard, a business (or any
other organization) must receive a third-party audit. Capital intensity, intensity of com-
petition, and dependence on overseas markets are all positively associated with voluntary
compliance with the standard (Chapple et al. 2001).
The best source of evidence about whether ﬁrms participate in CSR activities on their own
initiative is independent studies of socially responsible actions. Perhaps surprisingly, many
studiesofindividualbeyond-compliancebehavioranalyzeﬁrmsindevelopingcountries(e.g.,
Hartman, Huq, and Wheeler 1995; Hettige et al. 1996; Pargal and Wheeler 1996; Blackman
and Bannister 1998; Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler 2000). One possible reason for this
focus is that ﬁrms in industrialized countries are subject to a wide range of environmental
regulations that make it difﬁcult to judge whether their actions are legally required, risk-




Evidence of corporations making ﬁnancial contributions to charity supports the general
hypothesis that corporations can and do commit corporate resources to CSR. Average con-
tributions as a percent of net income before taxes increased, from less than 0.5 percent in theCorporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 13
1930sto1.1percentinthe1960sand1970s(HarrisandKlepper1976).Ingeneral,CEOsand
other high-level corporate ofﬁcers have a high degree of control over the amount and desti-
nationofcorporatecharitablecontributions,eveniftheircompanyhasestablishedaseparate
charitable foundation (Kahn 1997). But charitable giving can be curtailed by debtholders
(Brown, Helland, and Kiholm Smith 2006; Adams and Hardwick 1998). Overall, the evi-
dence shows that charitable giving is more likely when ﬁnancial and monitoring constraints




In 2005, the shareholders of public US corporations proposed 348 resolutions on social and
environmental issues, of which 177 reached a proxy vote (Social Investment Forum 2006).
On average, these resolutions have received support from 10–12 percent of all votes cast. Of
the 25 social policy resolutions in the United States that gained the highest percentage of
votes during the years 2003–2005, only six gained a majority of all votes cast. But winning
even a modest share of votes in a shareholder resolution can inﬂuence management policies.
Is There Evidence of Proﬁt-Sacriﬁcing Behavior?
According to our strict deﬁnition of CSR, beyond-compliance behavior is a necessary but
not sufﬁcient condition for CSR because, under some conditions, such behavior can be
proﬁtable. One way to measure the proﬁt sacriﬁced by socially responsible companies would
be to calculate the difference in proﬁtability between ﬁrms that do and do not participate in
socially responsibleactivities. In fact, a large literature, consistingof at least seventeen review
articles, has explored this relationship.8
The most recent and comprehensive review is by Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007).
In a meta-analysis of the results from 167 studies of the relationship between ﬁnancial per-
formance and socially responsible business practices (ignoring the mechanism and direction
ofcausality),theyﬁndthat27percentoftheanalysesshowapositiverelationship,58percent
show a non-signiﬁcant relationship, and 2 percent show a negative relationship.9 Margolis,
Elfenbein, and Walsh argue that the evidence indicates that CSR, in general, has little effect
on proﬁtability. However, they note that there is stronger evidence to suggest some causality
in the opposite direction: companies that are proﬁtable are more likely to engage in more
CSR activities.
TheﬁndingthatthereislittlerelationshipbetweenCSRandproﬁtabilityisconsistentwith
a market equilibrium in which ﬁrms invest in socially responsibleprojects until the marginal
returns decline to the overall market rate of return. In this situation, investing in CSR is not
proﬁtable (in the sense that it does not generate economic rents), but neither is it a losing
proposition. Instead it means that for most ﬁrms, CSR “pays for itself.”
8See, for example, Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatﬁeld 1985; Wood and Jones 1996; Grifﬁn and Mahon 1997;
Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003.
9Thirteen percent did not report a sample size that could be used to test signiﬁcance.14 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
These conclusions require a number of caveats. First, when evaluating studies of the
relationship between social responsibility and proﬁtability, it is important to keep in mind
that not all companies that are classiﬁed as socially responsible actually sacriﬁce proﬁts.
Many operate in industries, such as software development, that by their very nature have
little environmental or social impact. Second, many of the measures of CSR used in such
studies are not consistent with CSR as we deﬁne it in this article. Thus, measured effects
on proﬁtability may have more to do with advertising, charitable contributions, or other
tangentially relevant factors than with CSR.
In summary,evidence on sacriﬁcingproﬁts in the socialinterest is lacking.The bulk of the
available evidence suggests that most ﬁrms view socially responsible actions in the same way
that they view more traditional business activities, such as advertising and R&D. Instead of
altruistically sacriﬁcing proﬁts, they engage in a more limited—but more proﬁtable—set of
socially beneﬁcial activities that contributes to their ﬁnancial goals. Hence, although propo-
nentsofsustainablebusinesspracticesmayarguethatbeingenvironmentallyresponsiblewill
inevitablyleadtohigherproﬁtsinthelongterm,therelationshipbetweensociallyresponsible
activities and proﬁtability may be best characterized as some ﬁrms will generate long-term
proﬁts from some socially responsible activities some of the time (Reinhardt 2000).
Should Firms Sacriﬁce Proﬁts in the Social Interest?
Even if ﬁrms may, can, and do sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social interest, an important normative
questionremains,namely,shouldthey?Inotherwords,isitreallyinthebroadlydeﬁnedsocial
interest for ﬁrms to carry out such activity? There are two main approaches to answering
this question. First, we can compare ﬁrms’ actual CSR choices with the CSR alternatives
availabletothem.Foranyﬁrm,suchalternativesincludeabroadrangeofprojectsaddressing
various private and public issues, costing different amounts, and resulting in varying degrees
of environmental protection and proﬁtability. For example, a power plant could reduce
its emissions of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, or particulate matter; switch to a renewable
sourceoffuel;implementajobtrainingprogramtobeneﬁtlocalcommunitymembers;make
a donation to a charitable organization; or take any number of other “socially responsible”
actions. The question of interest here is whether ﬁrms’ actual CSR choices are likely to be
optimal relative to available alternatives.
Asecondapproachtakesapublicpolicyperspective,whereacomparisonismadebetween
allowing CSR (i.e., permitting ﬁrms to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social interest) and prohibiting
CSR(i.e.,requiringﬁrmsexclusivelytomaximizeproﬁtsforshareholders).Toevaluatethese
two approaches, we employ a variety of criteria, including social welfare and legal, political,
and social considerations.
Social Welfare
In the context of CSR, the social welfare criterion suggests that: (1) ﬁrms should invest in
projects that produce the highest level of social welfare; and (2) it is preferable to allow CSR
if aggregate welfare is likely to be higher when CSR is allowed than when it is prohibited.
The beneﬁts of CSR include direct welfare gains to individuals, such as asthmatics living
near a power plant that voluntarily reduces its emissions. More broadly, if ﬁrms voluntarilyCorporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 15
internalize externalities, a more efﬁcient allocation of resources may result. Of course, there
is no reason, ex ante, to anticipate that ﬁrms will reduce externality-producing activities to
efﬁcient levels.
The direct costs of CSR are the loss of consumer surplus resulting from ﬁrms pro-
ducing less output at higher cost and hence at higher prices. In addition, shareholders
receive reduced ﬁnancial returns. On the other hand, some shareholders may gain utility
from the knowledge that their proﬁts have been invested in socially responsible projects.
There are a number of reasons to believe that ﬁrms do not make socially optimal CSR
investments, in the sense of choosing activities that generate the greatest net social beneﬁts,
subject to budgetary constraints. This is because ﬁrms’ CSR decisions are inﬂuenced by a
number of factors that are unrelated to social beneﬁts and costs.
First,ﬁrms’CSRinvestmentchoicesareinﬂuencedbymanagers’personalpreferencesand
ﬁrm characteristics. For example, some managers may favor building art museums, while
others favor the provision of affordable housing. This idiosyncratic element of personal
preference is particularly likely if principal/agent issues drive CSR (Butler and McChesney
1999). Similarly, ﬁrms’ choices about CSR activities are affected by the nature of their
industry, ﬁrm size, technical capabilities, and relevant expertise, geographic location, and
existing regulatory limits. To the extent that these factors are unrelated to the social beneﬁts
andcostsofCSR,theirinﬂuenceonﬁrmdecisionsaboutCSRmayresultinsocialinefﬁciency.
Second, although ﬁrms may be well informed about the private costs of CSR, they may
havelittleexperienceevaluatingitssocialbeneﬁts,leadingthemtochooseinefﬁcientlevelsof
environmentalprotectioneffort.Third,ﬁrmsmayfailtoconsideralternativemechanismsto
achieve their social goals. For example, ﬁrms may be able to achieve higher social returns by
donating proﬁts to charities, which are dedicated exclusively to the task of improving social
welfare and thus presumably are well suited to the task. If this is the case, then ﬁrms that
fund CSR activities effectively “crowd out” their own donations to more efﬁcient charities
(GraffZivinandSmall2005).Finally,choiceofCSRactivityisaffectedbytheﬁrm’sabilityto
sacriﬁceproﬁts.Firmsthatarethemostproﬁtablearealsothemostabletosacriﬁceproﬁtsin
the public interest. However, the opportunity cost of sacriﬁcing proﬁts may also be greatest
for these ﬁrms, assuming they could otherwise invest the resources in their businesses and
earn similarly high returns.
Although there are reasons to doubt the optimality of ﬁrms’ decisions about CSR, there
are also reasons to believe that ﬁrms’ CSR investment decisions may increase welfare. First,
ﬁrms have access to private information about their current and future pollution activities,
including control costs. Such information can lead ﬁrms to identify better policies than less
well-informed government agencies. Second, ﬁrms have relevant expertise and operational
capacity. Third, government policies are driven by a variety of objectives, only one of which




open space—aremandatedto somedegreeby federal,state,or locallawsand regulations.To
the extent that such regulations require a level of environmental protection that is below the
socially optimal level, additional corporate investment in these activities can increase social
welfare(ifincrementalsocialbeneﬁtsexceedincrementalsocialcosts).Inaddition,theremay16 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
be socially responsible activities that address environmental issues that are unregulated but
ofsigniﬁcantscientiﬁcorpoliticalconcern(e.g.,globalclimatechange).Insuchcases(i.e.,in
the absence of government policies), CSR activities may lead to positive net social beneﬁts.
However, given that it appears to be relatively rare for ﬁrms to actually sacriﬁce proﬁts in the
socialinterest,theoverallnetwelfareﬂowfromCSR,whetherpositiveornegative,isunlikely
to be large.
Legal, Political, and Social Considerations
Although legality is not synonymous with social desirability (as evidenced by the legality
of many socially undesirable activities), some observers would surely identify legality as a
normativecriterionbywhichtojudgemanyactions.Inthesecondsection,wearguedthatin
the United States and other common law countries, sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest is
notstrictlylegal,althoughinpracticeCSRisnotprohibitedbecauseofthebusinessjudgment
rule and problems of enforcement.
One argument that can be made against CSR is that it is not a democratic process. There
is no particular reason to believe that society should prefer ﬁrms’ choices and priorities to
the choices and priorities of a democratic government. Some observers might also argue
that corporations already dominate too many aspects of modern life, and that it would be
undesirable for them to control the supply of public goods as well.
Underabroaderinterpretationoftheideaofsocialresponsibility,however,itcanbeargued
thatbusinesseshaveamoralcommitmenttoholdthemselvestohigherethicalstandardsand
to engage in activities that beneﬁt society. In fact, in a poll of citizens’ attitudes towards the
responsibility of businesses in 23 developed and developing countries, public opinion seems
to support the notion that corporations in the West should “set higher ethical standards and
help build a better society.” In countries such as China and Kazakhstan, however, the notion
that corporations should “make proﬁts, pay taxes, create jobs, and obey all laws” dominates
(Environics International Ltd. 1999).
The Special Case of Developing Countries
Given that economic, social, and environmental conditions in developing countries are so
different from those in industrialized countries, one would expect the answers to normative
questions about CSR to also be different. For example, environmental regulations in the
developingworldareoftennotwellenforced.Hence,manyrelativelycost-effectiveinterven-
tions that have already been implemented in industrialized countries may still be available
to businesses that operate in the developing world. This suggests that CSR could lead to
signiﬁcant gains in net social welfare.
Other concerns about CSR arise in the developing country context. Precisely because
legal and contractual systems often operate poorly in developing countries, it is important
to prevent activities that could erode the basis for future economic growth. Thus, strong
investor protections may be particularly desirable in developing economies (Marinov and
Heiman 1998) to help buttress the political viability of privatization and market-based
systems. Allowing managers to divert proﬁts to socially responsible projects means giving
managers substantial discretion. However, there is also the risk that this discretion could
tempt managers to use corporate resources for personal gain.Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens 17
Summary and Conclusions
This article has examined the concept of ﬁrms sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the social interest in
the environmental realm. In this section, we summarize our answers to the four questions
posedattheoutset:May theydosowithinthescopeoftheirﬁduciaryresponsibilitiestotheir
shareholders? Can they do so on a sustainable basis? Do ﬁrms behave this way? And, ﬁnally,
should ﬁrms carry out such proﬁt-sacriﬁcing activities?
Our starting point for examining the ﬁrst question—may they—was the prevailing view
among economists and business scholars that corporate directors have a ﬁduciary duty to
maximizeproﬁtsforshareholders.Surprisingly,thelegalbasisforthisviewisnotverystrong.
Although the judicial record is supportive of a duty to maximize proﬁts for shareholders,
it leaves room for ﬁrms to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the public interest. Moreover, the “business
judgment rule” effectively protects many public-minded managerial actions from successful
legal challenge.
Are ﬁrms in the United States prohibited from sacriﬁcing proﬁts in the public interest?
Andifso,istheprohibitionenforceable?Theanswerstothesetwosub-questionsappeartobe
“maybe”and“no,”respectively.UScorporatelawisconsistentwiththeshareholderprimacy
model, but as long as managers claim some plausible connection to future proﬁtability, the
business judgment rule grants them leeway to commit corporate resources to projects that
beneﬁt the public.
Just because the legal system may allow ﬁrms to sacriﬁce proﬁts in the social interest does
n o tm e a nt h a tﬁ r m scan do so on a sustainable basis in the face of competitive pressures.
Undermanyconditions,ﬁrmsthatparticipateincostlyCSRactivitieswillhavetoraiseprices,
reduce wages and other costs, accept smaller proﬁts, or pay smaller dividends—and accept
the economic consequences. After taking such measures, a ﬁrm’s stock price may decline
until proportional to returns, and attracting new capital may be difﬁcult because returns
are below market averages. Other short-term economic consequences may include loss of
market share, increased insurance costs, increased borrowing costs, and loss of reputation.
In the long term, the ﬁrm may face shareholder litigation, corporate takeover, or closure.
Thisprocessofeconomicsurvivaloftheﬁttestsuggeststhatﬁrmsthatengageinunsustain-
able CSR may ﬁnd themselves being pushed out of business. Given the seemingly inevitable
outcome of this process, why would any ﬁrms choose to participate in unsustainable CSR
activities? First, the ﬁrms that engage (or say they engage) in CSR are often active in markets
that are imperfect or distorted by government intervention, so that they are protected from
Friedman’s evolutionary imperatives. Second, principal/agent problems may lead managers
to make decisions that commit the ﬁrm to short-term CSR actions, even if those activities
will not be continued in the long run.
DespitealargeandgrowingliteratureonCSR,evidenceofﬁrmsactuallysacriﬁcingproﬁts
in the social interest is lacking. The bulk of the available evidence suggests that most ﬁrms
view socially responsible actions in the same way that they view more traditional business
activities.Insteadofaltruisticallysacriﬁcingproﬁts,theyengageinamorelimited—butmore
proﬁtable—set of socially beneﬁcial activities that contributes to their ﬁnancial goals.
Although proponents of sustainable business practices may argue that being environ-
mentally responsible will inevitably lead to higher proﬁts in the long-term, the relationship
between socially responsible activities and proﬁtability may be best characterized as some18 F. L. Reinhardt et al.
ﬁrms will generate long-term proﬁts from some socially responsible activities some of the
time.
IsitinthesocialinterestforﬁrmstoengageinCSR?Moretothepoint,shouldgovernments
allow such activity? To the extent that existing regulations require a level of environmental
protection that is below the socially optimal level, additional corporate investment in CSR
activitiesmayincreasesocialwelfare.Inthiscontext,CSRshouldbeviewedasacomplement
to, rather than a substitute for, increasingly effective government regulation.
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